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Abstract  
Previous research has reported on structural changes in Chinese families. However, questions 
remain as to whether/how social change has influenced family and gender values and how 
this differs across generations, regions, and gender in China. Drawing on 2006 data from the 
China General Social Survey, we find that values pertaining to filial piety are traditional, 
whereas patrilineal and gender values are less traditional. Historic events/ policies provide the 
context for how social change can shape differential generational, geographic, and gender 
perspectives. Our hypothesis that generation, region, and gender associations will differ 
across the various ideational domains is confirmed. We find significant interaction effects in 
how generation and geography differ by gender in patrilineal, filial piety, and gender values; 
and higher education erodes patrilineal and traditional gender values but enhances filial piety. 
Such findings indicate that family values should be understood in the specific sociocultural 
contexts governing Chinese families across time and place.  
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Family is generally believed to be the “building block” of Chinese society. In the sociological 
literature, however, there is a dearth of empirical attitudinal research into gender roles and 
family values (Shek, 2006). Over the past decades, China has undergone drastic social 
changes, including the founding of P.R. China, Reform and Opening-up, urbanization and 
globalization, and so on. These changes raise the question of what has happened to the family 
in China during recent decades: Has it changed, and if so, how?  
The changes in Chinese family structure have received considerable attention from 
researchers. Ma, Shi, Li, Wang, and Tang (2011), for example, have identified such trends as 
ever-decreasing family size, the decline of patrilocalism (multigenerational coresidence), 
rocketing divorce rates and hence single-motherhood (Wang & Zhou, 2010), and the rise of 
dual-earner and DINK (“dual-income-no-kids”) families. These structural changes have been 
interpreted as going hand-in-hand with changes in family and gender values in China (Zhang, 
2008; Zimmer & Kwong, 2003). However, it is far from clear whether structural change 
necessarily entails value shift, or vice versa. The research of Zimmer and Kwong (2003), for 
example, demonstrates that change in China’s age structure does not prompt a similar change 
in filial piety. Also, as Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn (2008, p. 2) point out, structural 
changes alone are “insufficient for explaining family change across the globe.” Their 
approach to understanding family change involves the study of ideational change. They 
explore how beliefs and values interact with unique historical and cultural circumstances to 
reveal important variations in behavior and thought. This approach emphasizes the 
importance of examining both variations across different aspects of family and gender values 
in China and also the differential effects that Chinese social and cultural changes might have 
on family views of people of different generations, geographic regions, and gender.  
Previous research, particularly transnational studies using data from the EASS (East Asia 
Social Survey), has compared family and gender values between East Asian countries/regions 
such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and mainland China (Iwai & Yasuda, 2009; Lin & Yi, 
2013; Yeh, Yi, Tsao, & Wan, 2013). However, transnational studies have considered China 
as a whole instead of reflecting its internal diversity. Since the establishment of a socialist 
regime in 1949, there has been enormous social and economic change. This would include 
the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, Reform and Opening-up, and the one-child 
policy (Bauer, Wang, Riley, & Zhao, 1992; Cheung & Kwan, 2009; Deng & Treiman, 1997). 
Such change has not only influenced the country as a whole, but specific events and policies 
have affected men and women of different generations and geographic regions differently 
(Shek, 2006; Whyte, 2005).  
Given these internal differences, the notion of “Chinese family values” in the aggregate is 
problematic. One aim of our research is to explore variations in family and gender values in 
order to address the following key questions: (a) What family and gender values do people 
share in contemporary China? (b) How are various aspects of family and gender values 
perceived differently? (c) How do views differ across time (different generations), place (the 
various geographic regions), and gender?  
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In the following sections, we discuss the relevant background context for addressing these 
questions. First, we review the traditional basis of family and gender values in China. 
Second, we present a succinct overview of the historical and policy changes in China that 
may influence views about family life. Third, we introduce the theoretical and empirical 
literature from which we derive our hypotheses. We then present our empirical analysis of the 
2006 Chinese General Social Survey and conclude by discussing the implications of our 
findings.  
 
Family and Gender Values in China: Traditions  
In China, traditional family and gender values inform two major sets of relations within the 
familial system. Vertically, intergenerational relations are regulated by filial piety; and 
horizontally, gender roles shape conjugal (husband–wife) relations (Schein, 1997; Yeh et al., 
2013). The responsibilities, obligations, rights, and powers of family relations are further 
underpinned by the norm of patrilineality: the male-centered line of descent (Johnson, 1985).  
The patrilineal system is key to traditional Chinese family and gender values. First, it 
emphasizes the male line of descent, which gives precedence to the eldest male in the family 
and makes a male heir vital to keep the family lineage intact (Song, 2008). Second, 
patrilineality regulates the family’s economic relations in terms of inheritance. In traditional 
China, the inheritance would drip down through the family, decreasing in order of priority as 
determined by gender/age. Chinese tradition also prescribed a certain reciprocity: The eldest 
male, with the greatest entitlement to inherit, would usually coreside with his parents in order 
to fulfill his filial obligations. Third, patrilineality was key to the traditional Chinese 
definition of family boundaries. With unbroken male lineage vital to the family’s survival, 
married women were considered the property of their husbands’ families (Baker, 1979). As in 
the traditional Chinese proverb that one’s “married daughter is like the splashed water that 
cannot be taken back,” a woman’s husband’s family was expected to take precedence over 
her biological family, especially in the case of clashing benefits. In general, the central 
message codified by patrilineal traditions was that of obedience to one’s superiors, with elder 
and/or male members deemed superior to those of younger and/or female members.  
Built on the basic guidelines established by patrilineality, filial piety prescribes specific 
relations and obligations between parents and children. As indicated by the Chinese terms for 
filial piety, xiao jing or xiao shun, which is expressed in two characters, the concept has two 
distinct meanings that are complementary and consistent (Bell, 2010). First, xiao requires 
children, especially adult children to reciprocate by caring for parents in later life; thus 
parents are recompensed for their material investment in bringing up children (Chan & Tan, 
2004). In pre-1949 China, which lacked a welfare system, xiao was key to the functioning of 
Chinese families: It preserved family lineage, ensured childcare, and, most importantly, 
preserved the security of the elderly. The concept of xiao was integral to agricultural China, 
where growing old meant the loss of production capability, and elderly parents were 
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supported materially by their children. Second, jing or shun expresses the nonmaterial aspect 
of filial piety, which signifies respect for and obedience to the elderly. Jing or shun obliged 
children to be thankful to their parents for bringing them up, which in turn constituted the 
moral imperative to observe xiao in their conduct. Furthermore, it was considered an ultimate 
virtue for children, especially males, to honor their parents by making them proud (Chan & 
Tan, 2004; Deutsch, 2006).  
In the Chinese nuclear family, conjugal relations were arranged with the husband at the 
center of the household undertaking mainly productive activities. The wife’s role was 
complementary: to facilitate her husband’s productivity (Whyte & Parish, 1985). Women’s 
major function was reproductive, that is, giving birth (preferably to male heirs) and 
childrearing. This division of labor was central to conventional gender roles in China. The 
importance and particularity of economic activities relegated women and the domestic sphere 
to a secondary status (Bauer et al., 1992; Schein, 1997). Women were associated with 
domestic chores and men with career-based and productive activities (Deutsch, 2006).  
Thus traditional Chinese family and gender values were consistent with the functionality of 
both the nuclear and extended family, in aspects such as child-rearing, care of the elderly, and 
so on. Meanwhile, different aspects of family values—filial piety, patrilineality, and gender 
roles—are closely interweaved and are embedded in the socioeconomic and cultural contexts 
of traditional China—particularly the agricultural mode of production and the non-welfare, 
centralized feudal regime. If traditional family and gender values were a consistent self-
contained system and were closely affiliated to their specific environment, it makes sense to 
explore how resilient values are in the face of contextual shifts and whether traditional 
attitudes have shifted in response to social change.  
 
Social Change in China, 1949 to 2006  
In 1949, the founding of P.R. China marked the end of a feudal history lasting for more than 
2,000 years. Thence, industries and urban landscapes began to burgeon in China. Upholding 
an egalitarian ideal, the socialist revolution contributed to gender equity in employment and 
the subversion of patriarchal traditions. From 1949 to 1952, women’s participation in paid 
labor increased from almost nil before 1949 to 74%, as opposed to 87% for men (Nan & Xue, 
2002).  
From 1967 to 1977, the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward marked the climax of 
China’s socialist revolution. Gender equity in the public sphere and industrialization were 
further emphasized (Roberts, 2010; Stockman, 1994). Confucian teachings that were core to 
traditional Chinese family values were attacked along with patriarchy. The Cultural 
Revolution also had a pronounced effect on eradicating the educational privilege associated 
with family background, by making the educational attainment of men more equitable (Deng 
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& Treiman, 1997). At the same time, both males and females were mobilized to rural areas 
for the agenda of social construction (Clark, 2008).  
Legalized in 1979, the one-child policy substantially altered the traditional family structure, 
with nuclear “2 + 1” families gradually becoming the norm in China (Greenhalgh, 2008). 
Although, at one time, the policy was accompanied by numerous female infanticides (Croll, 
2012), it has been attributed with helping to undermine patrilineal norms (Deutsch, 2006). 
However, the one-child policy has not eroded filial piety, despite changing forms of 
intergenerational support (Yeh et al., 2013; Zimmer & Kwong, 2003). The impact of the one-
child policy on women’s roles are somewhat mixed. Policy-makers claimed that family 
downsizing would liberate women from domestic duties (Greenhalgh, 2001). However, some 
scholars suggest that the policy might have led to Chinese women’s greater engagement in 
housework and childcare (Chow & Chen, 1994). Linking policy and gender role outcome is 
problematic, however, not least because the one-child policy coincided with Reform and 
Opening-up.  
In late 1978, Reform and Opening-up—a State-guided program for economic 
modernization—opened China’s market to the rest of the world (Wong & Bo, 2010). As the 
socialist pressure relaxed, it became possible for China’s culture to take its own course albeit 
directed by the priority of economic development (Boden, 2008; Goodman, 1988). 
Urbanization and industrialization escalated, and the country has been increasingly exposed 
to Western culture due to booming commercial connections. For example, feminist thought 
became more influential, and the importance of economic independence and individualism 
entered the discourse of gender dynamics (Liu, Karl, & Co, 2013).  
Reform and Opening-up, although intended to bring about changes throughout the nation, 
was in practice unevenly implemented. China’s partial development in the 1980s prioritized 
economic construction in coastal areas, big cities, municipalities, and provincial capitals—
key strategic positions located mainly in urban China. As a result, these areas received the 
greatest exposure to Western culture in an era of increasing international trade and 
commerce. Previous research has noted how this affected many spheres of life, ranging from 
education, language, media and cultural activity to the consumption of daily commodities 
(Whyte & Parish, 1985). The political importance attached to “development” and economic 
success led to a valorization of urban, Western, and global trends over their rural, Eastern, 
and local counterparts (Whyte, 2010). Consequently, urban and Western culture became 
increasingly popular in China, especially among people born after the 1980s.  
In addition to the various sociocultural changes caused by Reform and Opening-up, the 
hukou policy—China’s household registration system— increased sociocultural division. 
Legalized in 1952, the hukou policy was designed to control population mobility and secure 
enough labor for each sector of production (Wang, 2005). It fixed people geographically by 
localizing welfare packages such as unemployment subsidies, medical care, and so on. The 
distinction between rural and urban hukou further exacerbated the divide between agricultural 
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and industrial modes of production (Wu & Treiman, 2007), though the recent reform of the 
policy has since led to large-scale internal migration in China.  
 
Family Values: Explaining Differences  
One of the key insights of ideational research on family change is that rather than producing 
uniform change, as some of the globalization theorists imply (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2003), 
the interaction of ideational forces with unique historical and cultural circumstances results in 
important variations (Jayakody et al., 2008). It seems likely that in a country as internally 
varied as China, there is unlikely to be uniformity in family and gender values. One of our 
key concerns is to explore what we call “ideational consistency.” We expect some erosion of 
traditional values, as China has become increasingly global and open to Western values since 
late 1978. However, it is far from clear whether traditional values regarding patrilineality, 
filial piety, and gender roles would be challenged to a similar degree.  
Our brief review of traditional family and gender values suggested there were two major sets 
of relations within the familial system: intergenerational  
relations regulated by patrilineal norms and the consequent material and non-material strands 
of filial piety; and conjugal relations governed by gender role norms. It seems plausible, in 
the light of existing theoretical and empirical research, that gender role ideational change will 
vastly outpace any erosion of traditional filial piety.  
Inglehart and Norris (2003) suggest that there is a “rising tide” of gender equality and cultural 
change around the world. While we do not subscribe to any notion of global convergence, 
there is evidence that China has taken steps to promote women’s equality. As we have seen 
women play an important role in the labor force, despite there being no equal-employment 
legislation to date (Li & Chen, in press). Women have long had the right to marry who they 
chose and the right to divorce (Croll, 1981), even though attitudes toward equality in 
conjugal relations lag behind (Yan, 2003).  
But what about intergenerational relations? It is arguable that in China the emphasis on 
subordination of the young to the welfare of their parents became elaborated to an unusual 
degree, and that the form of family life within which socialization for filial piety occurred 
was distinctive (Whyte, 2003). During the changes since the establishment of P.R. China in 
1949, state-run educational institutions and bureaucratic assignments to jobs and housing 
replaced job training and inheritance from parents. But the Chinese Communist Party has at 
no point systematically attempted to get young Chinese to reject filial obligations. In fact the 
reverse, education in contemporary China has consistently stressed jing as a Chinese virtue, 
inculcating the moral imperatives of filial obligations (Liu, 2008). Empirical research seems 
consistently to show that filial obligations are alive and well, even in urban China (Whyte, 
2003; Zimmer & Kwong, 2003).  
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It is one thing to assert that an interaction of ideational forces with unique, historical and 
cultural circumstances results in important variations (Jayakody et al., 2008). It is another to 
specify along what dimensions these variations might be structured. In this article, we 
examine three dimensions, which have received considerable emphasis in the literature on 
family value change. Following Giddens (1987) we see temporality and space (or time and 
place) as crucial for understanding social change. In empirical work on ideational change 
these dimensions can be most easily operationalized as generational and geographic 
variations. Our third dimension is gender, which, as Therborn (2004) demonstrates, is a 
crucial dimension of family change, as sex and power are core to the changing politics of 
family.  
 
Generational Difference  
Mannheim’s (1952) essay on the importance of generations is a classic work about how 
generations underpin social change. Generational replacement is a key mechanism of social 
change, whereby the stance of the public can shift as earlier cohorts, with more traditional 
values, die out and recent cohorts, with less traditional values, take their place. To the extent 
that family and gender roles are changing in China we would expect to see marked 
generational differences in values. However, these are likely to vary by issue, with greater 
generation differentiation on patrilineality and gender roles, where traditional values are 
under increasing challenge, than by filial piety where traditional values are expected to hold 
sway.  
 
Geographical Difference  
The importance of geography in understanding family change has been emphasized again and 
again in cross-national research (Jayakody et al., 2008; Therborn, 2004). Regional differences 
within countries have been somewhat less well-explored in representative survey research, 
usually because of data limitations. In China, there is an increasing gulf between the highly 
developed urban areas in the east and the rural and western regions of China. However, as 
Whyte (2003) notes market reforms driven by global forces were instituted in Chinese 
villages earlier than in the cities, which may result in family continuities and changes that 
span rural and urban China.  
 
Gender Difference  
No family research today can ignore the importance of gender. As Therborn (2004) indicates 
understanding family values means understanding sex and power in a particular cultural 
setting. Research on international differences in family values and gender roles tends to 
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report either a surprising degree of similarity between men and women (Braun & Scott, 2009) 
or women being more likely to challenge traditional values than men because women stand to 
benefit more from change (Esping-Andersen, 2009). There is a dearth of research on family 
and gender values in China, and one important goal of our research is to examine whether 
there are consistent gender differences across the different family and value domains and also 
whether generation and geography interact with gender in structuring values concerned with 
patrilineality, filial piety, and gender roles. Women may be less traditional than men 
regarding patrilineality and gender roles, because women have more to gain by changing the 
status quo. However, there may be little gender difference regarding filial piety because the 
intergenerational system of family care is one in which both women and men have invested 
interests.  
 
Hypotheses  
Drawing on the literature and discussion of the preceding sections, we propose four 
hypotheses, as below. Our exploration of family and gender values will address the following 
three key categories: (a) patrilineality, (b) filial piety, and (c) gender roles.  
Hypothesis 1 (ideational consistency): There is no overall consistency in family and 
gender values regarding patrilineality, filial piety, and gender roles in China. Instead, we 
expect patrilineal and gender role values to be less traditional than filial piety.  
Hypothesis 2 (generational difference): Generational difference will affect family and 
gender values, with more recent cohorts holding less traditional attitudes in particular 
domains.
Hypothesis 3 (geographical difference): People from rural and western China will 
have more traditional family and gender values than people from urban, eastern areas.  
Hypothesis 4 (gender difference): Women in China will hold less traditional attitudes 
toward certain family and gender values than Chinese men.  
 
Methods  
Data  
In this article, we use data from the 2006 China General Social Survey (CGSS). The CGSS 
was conducted annually from 2003 to 2008, in collaboration with General Social Surveys in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. CGSS 2006 included a Family Module, which constituted part of 
the East Asia Social Survey. Recognized by the International Social Survey Program, CGSS 
data are standardized by the Data Documentation Initiative run by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research Centre at Michigan University. Led by China’s 
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Renmin University and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, CGSS is one 
of the largest-scale nationwide social surveys conducted in China and offers the most up-to-
date publicly released survey data pertaining to Chinese families.  
The general response rate of CGSS 2006 was 51.1%. Using multistage- stratified sampling, 
CGSS 2006 sampled 10,000 individuals from 500 street areas in 125 cities/towns across 
China, of which 3,208 individuals further participated in the Family Module—1,754 females 
and 1,454 males ranging from 18 to 69 years old.  
We use CGSS 2006 data for two major reasons. First, CGSS 2006 surveyed different aspects 
of family and gender values in China, systematically assessing values ranging from filial 
piety to conjugal roles in the nuclear family. Second, the survey had a wide coverage, ranging 
from major cities to remote villages and from eastern coast to western hinterland.  
 
Variables  
Dependent Variables: Family and Gender Values in China. CGSS 2006 measured family and 
gender values using 7-point Likert-type scales. We have standardized all measures such that 
“1” represents the most traditional attitudes and “7” represents the least traditional attitudes 
toward family and gender values. Altogether, 15 items were used to measure attitudes toward 
traditional family and gender values in China, as presented in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Exploratory factor analysis was used to extract our indexes for Chinese family and gender 
values (see Appendixes A and B for details). We assessed the factorability of the 15 items 
relating to family and gender values and found the item correlations to be reasonably high. 
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.76, and Barlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant (χ
2
[105] = 21,173.25, p < .001). Principal component analysis and 
Varimax rotation were used to guide computing composite scores for the indexes. Cronbach’s 
alpha scores showed high consistency within each of the indexes. No substantial increase in 
alpha for any of the indexes could have been achieved by eliminating items. Each index is 
scaled from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating a less traditional attitude toward traditional 
Chinese family and gender values. Our sample consists of 3050 cases, after outliers were 
removed. Indices were within a range sufficient to assume normal distributions.  
Key Predictors and Covariates. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our key 
predictors and covariates. Our key predictors are generations, geographic regions, and 
gender. We coded birth cohorts into four groups based on the different historic events or 
periods: presocialist (born before 1949), socialist (1950-1966), Cultural Revolution (1967-
1977), and Reform/ Opening-up (born after 1978). In CGSS 2006, geographic regions are 
differentiated by the administrative and development levels as “major cities (municipals, 
provincial capitals, etc.),” “eastern towns/villages,” “central towns/villages,” and “western 
towns/villages.” Gender is a dummy variable.  
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Given the potential influence of such important demographic and personal characteristics as 
marital status, number of child(ren), level of education, knowledge of foreign language, and 
employment status we included these attributes as covariates. Education levels are grouped 
into “primary school and below,” “middle school,” “high school,” and “university and 
above.” Employment is coded into a dummy variable indicating “working” and “not 
working.”  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Analytical Strategy  
Using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on each aspect of family and gender values, we ran 
three models: (a) only key predictors, (b) covariates added, and (c) interactions between 
generation and gender, geography and gender, and gender and employment added. Other 
interaction terms were not significant and are excluded. Comparisons across the models allow 
us to examine whether generational, geographic, and gender variations in family and gender 
values are explained (mediated) by the addition of factors such as work, education, and so on.  
 
Results  
Family and Gender Values  
Figure 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the family and gender values. First, the results 
show that attitudes toward family and gender values in today’s China generally remain 
traditional, on the assumption that “4,” the mid-point of the 7-point scale of our indexes, 
represents a neutral attitude. Second, the findings support our hypothesis that there is no 
overall consistency in family and gender values.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Our results indicate that attitudes are least traditional toward patrilineal values. The 
detraditionalization of patrilineality (i.e., the central thread of traditional intergenerational 
family values), however, has not undermined the filial piety it once sustained. Attitudes 
toward filial piety in terms of both xiao and jing remain traditional. Jing, the moral 
imperative that obliges one to be obedient and respectful to parents, stays the most traditional 
among these measures of family and gender values. Attitudes to xiao, material support to the 
elderly, are also relatively traditional, although responses differ depending on whether 
financial support is to be provided by unmarried or married children. In Chinese tradition, 
unmarried children usually coreside with their parents, while material support is generally 
expected from financially independent children.  
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In contrast, attitudes toward gender roles that specify relations between husband and wife are 
less traditional. The traditional gender division of labor whereby the husband’s role is to earn 
money and the female’s role is to care for her family and support her husband’s career is not 
given overwhelming support in contemporary China.  
 
Multivariate Analysis  
Table 3 presents the results of the three ANCOVA models for each of our five dependent 
variables (patrilineality, “xiao [married],” “xiao [unmarried],” “jing,” and gender roles). In 
each instance, the three models show main predictors (Model A), predictors plus covariates 
(Model B), and predictors, covariates, and interaction terms (Model C). Our findings indicate 
that generational, geographic, and gender variations have diverse effects on different aspects 
of family and gender values. Controlling for education matters, particularly for explaining 
some of the generational effects. The addition of interaction terms between predictors and 
gender somewhat improves the explained variance (r2) of the two least traditional of our 
dependent variables—patrilineality and gender roles. However, most of the variance in 
family values remains unexplained by these main independent variables. We consider 
possible explanations for the low explanatory power of our models in the discussion section. 
First, however, we present the findings for each of the family and gender values in turn.  
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Patrilineality. Our results support our hypothesis that more recent cohorts hold less 
traditional attitudes toward patrilineal values. The geographic difference hypothesis is only 
partly supported by our findings. Compared with western rural towns/villages, people from 
the more urbanized and industrialized regions exhibit significantly less traditional attitudes 
toward patrilineality, with the exception of eastern towns/villages. The findings also support 
our gender difference hypothesis and show that women hold significantly less traditional 
attitudes than men toward patrilineality.  
In Model 1b where the covariates are included, the results clearly show the importance of 
education in reducing traditional patrilineal beliefs. People who are better educated hold less 
traditional attitudes toward patrilineality. Interestingly, introducing education eliminates the 
observed generational effects (in Model 1a) and thus for patrilineal beliefs, generational 
effects can be explained by education. The geographic effect remains when education is 
included, which suggests that the degree of urbanization and industrialization associated with 
the different geographic regions operates independently of education in influencing 
patrilineal beliefs. In Model 1c, which includes the interaction terms between gender and the 
predictor variables, we can see that females from the Reform and Opening-up generation 
hold significantly less traditional attitudes toward patrilineality than men and women from 
other generations. Once interactions terms are included in Model 1c gender is no longer 
significant.  
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Filial Piety (Xiao and Jing). Our generational hypothesis is overturned when it comes to filial 
piety. We find that the more recent generations hold more traditional attitudes toward xiao, 
though attitudes differ between financial support from married or unmarried children. The 
geographic effects also vary across different aspects of filial piety. Unlike for patrilineal 
beliefs, there are no gender differences with respect to filial piety.  
For “xiao (unmarried),” only the Reform and Opening-up generation displays slightly less 
traditional attitudes than the earliest pre-1949 cohort. Nevertheless, even this generational 
effect disappears once we include covariates, with married people less likely to support the 
view that unmarried offspring should provide financial support to parents. People from 
central towns/villages show less traditional attitudes toward “xiao (unmarried)” than those in 
western towns and villages. In Model 2c, the interaction of work and gender shows that 
employed women hold more traditional attitudes than either men or women who are not 
employed toward unmarried offspring providing financial support to parents. Thus, financial 
independence of women should not be equated with more individualistic or liberal 
attitudes—at least as far as filial piety is concerned.  
For “xiao (married),” more recent generations are significantly more traditional in beliefs that 
married children should provide financial support to parents. While attitudes are generally 
consistent across geographic regions, people from major cities are less traditional than 
western town/villages. This geographic variation is further elaborated in Model 3c, which 
includes the interaction of gender and geographic regions. Model 3c shows that women living 
in major cities hold significantly less traditional attitudes toward the practice of financial 
support for parents than do those living in other regions. The results for “xiao (married)” 
echo those for “xiao (unmarried)”: Marriage predicts less traditional attitudes, and employed 
women hold more traditional views about supporting parents financially. People who are 
relatively highly educated also display a stronger traditional support for “xiao (married).”  
Our results do not support the generational hypothesis for jing. Instead, we find that the moral 
imperatives for filial piety remain strong and highly consistent across generations. People 
from eastern towns/villages show significantly more traditional attitudes toward jing, though 
ideations are by and large consistent across geographic regions. As is the case for xiao, the 
results suggest that higher education reinforces the moral imperatives for filial piety.  
Gender Roles. The Reform and Opening-up generation is by far the least traditional when it 
comes to gender roles, which is in accordance with our generational hypothesis. There are 
also marked geographic differences, with those in major cities and central towns least likely 
to hold traditional gender role beliefs. In Model 5b, our findings suggest that the generational 
effect is largely explained by the inclusion of the number of children, education, and 
knowledge of a foreign language. People with more than one child display more traditional 
attitudes toward gender roles than those who have no children or one child. Thus our findings 
are consistent with those who suggest that the one-child policy might help endorse more 
egalitarian gender role beliefs. However, this interpretation is speculative, in part because 
family planning policy is unlikely to be solely responsible for single-children households. We 
find that people who have received higher education hold significantly less traditional 
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attitudes toward gender roles. We also find that people who have knowledge of a foreign 
language hold less traditional gender role attitudes. One possible interpretation is that 
education and familiarity with other languages might increase exposure to Western culture 
and feminist ideas.  
The results from Model 5c show that it is women from the Reform and Opening-up 
generation who are significantly less traditional than men and women from other generations 
in gender role attitudes. This is similar to our finding concerning patrilineal beliefs. In 
addition, employed women hold less traditional attitudes to gender roles than employed men 
or those who are not currently employed. Interestingly, when the gender and generation inter- 
action is included the coefficient for gender is negative, indicating that women in general are 
not less traditional than men. Thus our gender hypothesis is only partially supported for 
gender role beliefs.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Previous research has focused on changes in Chinese family structures (e.g., Johnson, 1985; 
Ma et al., 2011; Zimmer & Kwong, 2003). Citing family downsizing, the decline of 
coresidence, falling marriage rates, and rising divorce rates, some researchers have inferred 
that family and gender values are changing, rendering many traditional views outdated in 
today’s China (Shek, 2006; Whyte & Parish, 1985; Zimmer & Kwong, 2003). How accurate 
are these inferences? The results of our analysis of family and gender values indicate that 
such claims are only partially supported. In general, traditional family and gender values are 
still quite widespread in contemporary China. In particular, our respondents strongly 
endorsed filial piety in its components, xiao and jing. However, attitudes toward patrilineal 
beliefs and gender roles prescribing a traditional gender division of labor had significantly 
less support. Thus the demise of traditional views in one dimension of family and gender 
values does not imply a similar questioning of traditional values in other dimensions.  
We concur with the ideational approach to family research (Jayakody et al., 2008) that insists 
that structural changes alone are insufficient for explaining family change. This approach 
expects beliefs and values to vary with unique historical and cultural circumstances, thereby 
revealing important variations in behavior and thought. The ideational approach questions the 
transnational family research that has examined Chinese family values in the aggregate. In 
the light of historic events such as the founding of China’s socialist regime, Cultural 
Revolution and Opening-up, the introduction of hukou and one-child policies, it is likely that 
Chinese social and cultural circumstances might differentially affect the views of people of 
different generations, geographic regions, and gender.  
We find considerable diversity in the way that generations, geographic regions, and gender 
help structure the distinctive family and gender values associated with patrilineal beliefs, 
filial piety, and gender roles. Interestingly, women of the Reform and Opening-up generation 
(born since 1978) display least support for patrilineal beliefs. There are also clear geographic 
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differences between the western towns and villages who adopt a more traditional stance and 
the central and metropolis/major cities that are less traditional. Education also matters in 
eroding support for traditional patrilineal beliefs. However, these same patterns do not carry 
across to filial piety, where traditional values hold sway in terms of both material support 
(xiao) and nonmaterial (jing) obligations to parents. In Chinese tradition, unmarried children 
usually coreside with their parents, whereas material support is generally expected from 
financially independent (married) children. Thus it is no surprise that the traditional 
obligations of “xiao (married)” are supported more strongly than for “xiao (unmarried).” 
However, for both, higher education and female employment are associated with more not 
less traditional beliefs. Thus one cannot infer a “liberating” effect of education or female 
employment across Chinese family and gender values. Education and female employment do 
reduce traditional support for patrilineal beliefs, but they have the opposite effect for filial 
piety as measured by xiao. Education also increases support for traditional filial piety as 
measured by the nonmaterial jing.  
When it comes to gender roles, we have somewhat more expected findings. Education 
enhances people’s endorsement of less traditional attitudes, and so does female employment. 
Women particularly from the most recent cohort (born since 1978) are most likely among the 
generations of both sexes to endorse less traditional views. Knowledge of a foreign language 
also decreases support for the traditional gender role divide. Not surprisingly, people with 
multiple children (two and above) are more likely than those with one or no child to endorse 
traditional gender roles.  
Our findings on gender roles are similar to findings in Western research that more recent 
generations, higher education, women’s employment, and smaller family size reduce support 
for traditional gender roles. Models including such explanatory variables in Western cultures 
could be expected to explain up to one fifth of the variation in gender role beliefs. However, 
in China family and gender values are not highly differentiated by the social and 
demographic characteristics that are commonly used by social scientists in their explanatory 
models. One possible reason might be that China is bureaucratically controlled to a far 
greater extent than the developed countries of the West. Thus other factors such as personal 
networks and bureaucratic position might be more important indicators. Unfortunately, we 
are unable to test such suppositions. Even income, although included in the survey, has major 
problems with missing data and has had to be excluded from our analysis. Moreover, our 
categorization of generations and geographic regions is necessarily crude, given the 
differential impact that China’s far-reaching programs of social and cultural change are likely 
to have had on family and gender values.  
Family values in China have undoubtedly been guided by the familism rooted in Confucian 
teachings (Li & Chen, in press). However, even in this limited cross-sectional analysis of 
Chinese General Social Survey, we have established that the Chinese do not cling to 
“traditional” views in all domains. Patrilineal beliefs and traditional gender roles are being 
questioned—and education, female employment, and the individualism associated with city 
life—are likely to erode traditional beliefs still further. So why does filial piety seem 
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relatively resilient to change? Our data do not allow us to give any definitive explanations. 
However, neither education nor urbanization is undermining filial piety, or at least not yet. 
Why? The argument that Whyte (2003) puts forward is that support for filial obligations are 
alive and well in urban China because (paradoxically) the nature of the urban social order 
constructed in the Maoist era and continued in the present era supported those obligations in 
multiple ways while making them fairly nononerous for grown children. Similarly, Zimmer 
and Kwong (2003) suggest that population aging is not shifting filial piety beliefs or behavior 
as much as might be expected. Whatever the explanation, it seems clear from our analysis is 
that in China, complex adjustments in family values are occurring, with traditional views 
challenged more in conjugal than in intergenerational relations.  
The primary purpose of this research is not to challenge modernization theory, in part, 
because of the limitations of our data set. However, our results might imply that some 
reconsideration of modernization theory is needed. For example, Goode (1963) suggests that 
“the underdeveloped countries of the world would eventually make a transition from 
traditional to modern in a fashion similar to the transition that had occurred in the West” 
(Cherlin, 2012, p. 581). Goode (1963) predicted that, as industrialization spread, the world’s 
family pattern should converge to the Western conjugal family model. Fifty years on since 
Goode predicted a global convergence trend our results demonstrate the distinctive, complex, 
national context effects in China on differing family and gender values. Such contextual 
differences merit further exploration in future research.  
Predictions about future family change in China are meaningless without good data. To 
follow through on this base line study we need comparable measures going forwards. Ideally, 
we also need longitudinal data to unpack individual change across time. With the vast 
internal migration flows and the dramatic changes in family policy, it remains an ongoing 
challenge to understand how the changing circumstances of husbands and wives and parents 
and child(ren) influence traditional family and gender values.  
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Table 1. List of Indexes and Measures for Family/Gender Values 
Indexes Measures 
Patrilineality 
(α=.60) 
1. The eldest male should inherit the largest share from his parents 
2. To preserve the family lineage, one should give birth to at least one male heir 
3. A married woman should help her spouse’s family first 
  
Xiao (material filial 
piety, unmarried) 
(α=.95) 
1. Unmarried men should give parents money 
2. Unmarried women should give parents money 
  
Xiao (material filial 
piety, married) 
(α=.91) 
1. Married men should give parents money 
2. Married women should give parents money 
3. Married men should give parents-in-law money 
4. Married women give support parents-in-law money 
  
Jin (non-material 
filial piety) 
(α=.80) 
1. I'm grateful to my parents for raising me 
2. No matter how parents behave, one should treat them well 
3. Support parents to help them live a comfortable life 
4. Children should behave in ways that honor their parents 
  
Gender role 
(α=.72) 
1. It is more important for a wife to support her husband's career than to develop  
    her own career 
2. The husband’s role is to make money, and the wife’s role is to look after family 
Note: Source: CGSS 2006 
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Note: Source: CGSS 2006 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Key Predictor and Covariates (N=3,050) 
Variables Percentage 
Generation  
Pre-socialist (pre-1949) 17.70 
Socialist (1950-66) 38.66 
Cultural revolution (1967-77) 27.74 
Reform/opening-up (1978-) 15.90 
Geographic region  
Western town/village  16.26 
Central town/village 34.23 
Eastern town/village 21.77 
Metropolis/major Cities 27.74 
Gender   
Female 54.49 
Male  45.51 
Marital Status  
Never Married 13.51 
Married and previously married (divorced/windowed) 86.49 
Child(ren)  
No child 17.48 
Single child 41.38 
Multiple children 41.15 
Education Level   
<=Primary school 28.98 
Middle school 33.93 
High school 25.25 
>=University (higher education) 11.84 
Foreign language  
Does not know any foreign language 65.51 
Knows one (or more than one) foreign language 34.49 
Work status  
Not working  37.22 
Now working  62.79 
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Appendix1. Factor Loadings of Measures for Family and Gender Values in China  (N=3,208) 
 Patrilineality 
Xiao 
(unma-
rried) 
Xiao 
(marr-
ied) 
Jin Gender role h
2 
A1 It is more important for a wife to support her husband's 
career than to develop her own career     .87 .78 
A2 The husband’s role is to make money, and the wife’s 
role is to look after family .26    .82 .74 
B1 The eldest male should inherit the largest share from 
his parents .81     .66 
B2 To preserve the family lineage, one should give birth to 
at least one male heir .66     .46 
B3 A married woman should help her spouse’s family first .66    .25 .49 
C1 Unmarried men should give parents money   .77   .63 
C2 Unmarried women should give parents money   .77   .60 
D1 Married men should give parents money   .79   .65 
D2 Married women should give parents money   .72   .56 
D3 Married men should give parents-in-law money  .25  .94  .95 
D4 Married women give support parents-in-law money  .26  .94  .95 
E1 I'm grateful to my parents for raising me  .81    .73 
E2 No matter how parents behave, one should treat them 
well  .85    .77 
E3 Support parents to help them live a comfortable life  .89    .82 
E4 Children should behave in ways that honor their parents  .89    .82 
Eigenvalues 1.64 1.85 2.44 3.15 1.52  
% of total variance  10.95 12.36 16.27 20.98 10.12  
Number of measures 3 4 4 2 2  
Article DOI: 10.1177/0192513X14528710  
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Appendix 2. Correlation Matrix of Measures for Family and Gender Values in China  (N=3,208) 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D1 E1 E2 E3 
A2 .493**              
B1 .164** .229**             
B2 .203** .285** .278**            
B3 .271** .271** .366** .206**           
C1 .123** .029 -.095** -.002 -.007          
C2 .073** .030 -.052** .014 .018 .548**         
C3 .060** .029 -.100** .038* .003 .490** .474**        
C4 .168** .124** -.023 .197** .081** .396** .383** .508**       
D1 .080** .065** -.010 .025 .034 .104** .099** .139** .111**      
D2 .069** .062** -.010 .015 .035 .093** .126** .140** .115** .898**     
E1 .119** .073** -.053** .004 .034 .243** .214** .244** .223** .381** .364**    
E2 .098** .067** -.055** -.033 .007 .210** .197** .232** .198** .356** .374** .767**   
E3 .106** .064** -.024 .016 .025 .180** .171** .208** .180** .366** .371** .624** .677**  
E4 .102** .060** -.029 .008 .031 .195** .176** .227** .193** .350** .371** .637** .668** .858** 
